Your traffic stays yours.
Your devices talk to one server, and it is yours. This page says how the road between them is protected, who can still see what, how updates reach you, and where the protection ends.
Six protections
- Encrypted to your server
- Everything between your devices and your server is encrypted, on every link.
- Keys that stay with you
- Each device makes its own keys, and they never leave it. Your server’s keys are yours.
- No company in the path
- Your devices only ever talk to your own server. Nothing passes through us, and nothing phones home.
- A silent server
- It answers only the devices you enrolled. Everyone else gets no reply.
- A kill switch from boot
- While Fenris is on, nothing leaves outside the tunnel: not while it connects, not after a crash, not during an update.
- Updates from your server
- Every release is signed, and your devices take it only from your own server, through the tunnel.
What is encrypted, and how.
From your device to your server, everything. No menu of older choices is offered, so there is nothing to talk a device down to.
| Part | What Fenris uses | In plain words |
|---|---|---|
| Protocol | TLS 1.3 inside QUIC, and nothing older | No session resumption and no 0-RTT: every connection does the whole handshake. |
| Key exchange | X25519MLKEM768 | A classical exchange and a post-quantum one together, meant to keep traffic recorded today closed to a future quantum computer. The tunnel has no classical-only fallback. |
| Ciphers | ChaCha20-Poly1305 or AES-256-GCM | Whichever your processor runs faster. |
| Who is who | Raw Ed25519 public keys on both ends | Each device knows its server’s keys, and the server knows each device’s. No certificate authority is involved. |
| Keys that roll | Every 2 minutes, or every gigabyte | Traffic keys are replaced at whichever comes first. This is a key update, not a new handshake. |
| Device keys | Made on the device | They never leave it. A lost device is revoked, and its sessions close within seconds. |
| Server keys | Renewed every 30 days, valid for 90 | The root key that certifies them can be kept off the server, sealed with a passphrase. |
| Joining | A one-time link | One use, 24 hours by default, a 20-character code. Both sides show it, so you can check they match. |
| Where UDP is blocked | TLS on TCP port 443, for that link | The tunnel inside is unchanged. The outer layer of that one link also accepts a classical exchange. |
| Past your server | Nothing added | From your server to a website, traffic is as protected as the website makes it. |
A server that says nothing to strangers.
Every connection’s first packet must carry a proof that only an enrolled device can make. It works once, for that handshake alone, and an observer can’t tell two of one device’s proofs from two devices’.
Who can see what.
Three ways to reach the internet, and the same three questions asked of everyone on the way. The last row of the third is the reason Fenris exists.
| Who | Where you are | Which sites you visit | What you send and read |
|---|---|---|---|
| Your internet provider | Sees it. It gave you the address. | Sees them. | Can’t read it on sites that use HTTPS. |
| The websites | See it. | Each knows its own visits. | Each reads what you send it. |
| Who | Where you are | Which sites you visit | What you send and read |
|---|---|---|---|
| Your internet provider | Sees it. | Can’t see them. Only that you use the VPN, and how much. | Can’t read it. |
| The VPN company | Sees it. | In a position to see them. You rely on its promise, and on its audits if it has them. | Can’t read it on sites that use HTTPS. |
| The websites | Can’t see it. They see an address shared by many people. | Each knows its own visits. | Each reads what you send it. |
| Who | Where you are | Which sites you visit | What you send and read |
|---|---|---|---|
| Your internet providers | See it. | Can’t see them. Only encrypted traffic to one address, your server’s, and how much. | Can’t read it. |
| Whoever hosts your server | Knows you as its customer. | In a position to see them, as your traffic leaves your server: the view an internet provider has today. | Can’t read it on sites that use HTTPS. |
| The websites | Can’t see it. They see your server’s address, which is yours alone. That is not anonymity. | Each knows its own visits. | Each reads what you send it. |
| Fenris | Nothing. | Nothing. | Nothing. No Fenris server is in the path. |
Nothing leaves around the tunnel
If your server can’t be reached, traffic waits. It does not slip out unprotected, and the app says so.
- Linux and OpenWrt
- Firewall rules in nftables, in place from early boot, before the network comes up.
- Windows
- Filters in the Windows Filtering Platform that outlast a restart.
- Mac
- Rules in pf.
- Android
- The system’s own always-on VPN.
- Hotel Wi-Fi sign-in
- One device is let through one link to the sign-in page, for up to 5 minutes. It does not open the rest.
- Networks you trust
- On wired networks you list, traffic may go direct after 30 seconds without your server. Never on open Wi-Fi, and off unless you set it.
Updates you can check, from a server you own.
A device never asks Fenris for an update. It takes one only from your own server, and only if the signatures lead back to a root key it has carried since it was installed.
- A device refuses
- Anything not signed down to a root key, a version older than the one it runs, and an offer that has expired.
- When it installs
- At a quiet moment. It waits out a call.
- If the new version fails
- A device that can’t reach your server on the new version goes back to the old one by itself.
Verify a download
The installer checks all of this before it touches anything. To do it by hand you need minisign and the two root keys on the right.
The release root keys
RWQ9qWTRwHYqd5a8SUyFovJBQKX4wSjcdkCcGMatZkUWoQps1ScuHjBv RWQfzbXAe45Fxwl5JizG5TLk4dK7+/PqAlWDG7Qhqfgen7rB5rwf6XUC
1. One of them certified this year’s release key
minisign -Vm release-key.pub -P RWQ9qWTRwHYqd5a8SUyFovJBQKX4wSjcdkCcGMatZkUWoQps1ScuHjBv
2. The release key signed your download
minisign -Vm fenris-linux-x86_64.tar.gz -p release-key.pub
Each command answers “Signature and comment signature verified”. The comment names the file and its version, so a signature can’t be moved to another file.
How it is checked
By machines, on every change. This is what was done, said exactly.
- Formal models
- The first-packet proof and joining are modelled in ProVerif, for secrecy, authentication and unlinkability.
- Fuzzing
- 17 fuzz targets, over every parser that reads what a stranger could send.
- Conformance tests
- They hold the encryption table above, and the server’s silence, to what this page says.
- Dependencies
- Every one is vetted, and each program comes with a bill of materials.
- Builds
- Each release is checked to build to the same bytes on another machine.
- Outside audit
- None. Fenris has not been audited.
What it does not protect you from
- Whoever hosts your server.They can see your traffic as it leaves for the internet, as an internet provider can today.
- Being recognised.Websites see one address that is yours alone. Fenris does not make you anonymous.
- The last stretch.From your server to a website, traffic is as protected as the website makes it.
- Being noticed, or blocked.A network can tell that you send a lot of encrypted traffic to one address, and can block it. Fenris is not built to get past censorship.
- Us getting it wrong.You run the Fenris programs as they come. They are signed, and checked as above, and not audited.
Reporting a flaw
- Where
- security@fenris.network. Tell us privately, and please do not post it publicly first.
- What to send
- What you did, what happened, and the version. A diagnostics file helps: it hides addresses and names unless you ask it not to.
- What happens
- You get a reply within 7 days. Security reports come before everything else, and reporters are credited unless they ask not to be.
- Bounty
- There is none.