# A silent server.

Your server answers only devices you enrolled. Every connection’s first packet must carry a proof only that device can make. Anything else gets no reply on the UDP port.

_Your server · Every device · Always on_ 

Four first packets reach your server’s UDP port

Your enrolled device is answered. A scanner, a copied packet and a revoked device get no reply.

**Fig. 1** On the UDP port. Where you allow TLS on TCP 443, that port answers a handshake first.

## What happens

1. A device you enrol holds a secret of its own, which your server can check.
2. The first packet of every connection carries a one-use proof made from it. The proof is bound to that one handshake, so a copy of it is worth nothing.
3. Your server checks the proof before it answers anything. A scan, a replay or a revoked device gets no reply at all on the UDP port.
4. By their proofs, an observer can’t tell two connections of one device from two devices.
5. Revoke a device and its proofs stop working. Its sessions close within seconds, and its number is never reused.

## What it costs

Silent on its UDP port. That is not the same as hidden.

**The first packet**

A 41-byte proof rides in the first packet of each connection. After that, nothing extra.

**On TCP**

Where you allow TLS on TCP 443, for networks that block UDP, that port completes a TLS handshake before the proof is checked. It answers a scan.

**With a name**

In domain mode your server shows a certificate, and a website you choose, to anyone who asks. Its name is public in certificate logs.

## Turn it on

It is always on. These decide who is let in.

| To                                           | Command line                                                                    | The console         |
| -------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------- |
| Make a one-time link for a new device        | fenris-server invite \--state /var/lib/fenris-server \--address <public IP>:443 | Add a device        |
| List the devices that may connect            | fenris-server devices \--state /var/lib/fenris-server                           | Devices             |
| Cut a device off                             | fenris-server revoke \--state /var/lib/fenris-server \--device <id>             | Devices, the device |
| Withdraw a link nobody has used              | fenris-server revoke \--state /var/lib/fenris-server \--invite <id>             | Add a device        |
| Replace the device secret after a compromise | fenris-server rotate \--state /var/lib/fenris-server \--token-key               | On your server      |

### Where to find it

**The console** Devices. Every device that may connect, by name.

The console’s Devices page, with example data: six devices by name, each with its state, its links, its throughput, its use today and its version.

**The console, on a phone** Add a device.

The console’s Add a device page, with example data: a one-time link for a named device, the code to check, and what to do on each platform.

**The console** Audit log. Attempts the server refused are there too, with their address.

The console’s Audit log, with example data: each event with its time, who did it, from where, and how it ended.

**The product** Three of its own screens, with example data.

## What it keeps

That a device is enrolled: its number, its name and its public keys, kept for good, so a revoked number is never used again. Each attempt your server refused is in the audit log for a year, with the address it came from.

[Everything your server keeps](https://fenris.network/privacy#kept)

## Where it stops

**Not hidden**

Your provider can see that you send traffic to your server’s address. Fenris does not hide that it is a tunnel.

**A lost device**

A proof shows that a packet came from an enrolled device, not who is holding it. Revoke a lost device from the console.

**Whoever hosts it**

Silence keeps strangers out. Whoever hosts your server can still see what leaves it.

**How it is checked**

Formal models cover the proof’s secrecy, its authentication and that it can’t be linked. There has been no outside audit.

## Related
